University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 18
Issue 1 Fall 1988

Article 7

1988

Comments: Equal Access to Pole Attachment
Agreements: Implications of Telephone Company
Participation in the Cable Television Market
John P. Morrissey
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Communications Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Morrissey, John P. (1988) "Comments: Equal Access to Pole Attachment Agreements: Implications of Telephone Company
Participation in the Cable Television Market," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 18: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol18/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

EQUAL ACCESS TO POLE ATTACHMENT
AGREEMENTS: IMPLICATIONS OF TELEPHONE
COMPANY PARTICIPATION IN THE CABLE
TELEVISION MARKET
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of cable television ("CATV") in the 1950's, the
CATV industry has spiraled in growth. The expansive development of
this communication medium, however, did not occur without the intervention of government regulation. One area identified by the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") that required governmental
oversight was access to utility poles and underground conduits for the
attachment of cable distribution equipment. 1
Historically, the CATV industry has utilized leasing arrangements
to secure access for cable distribution systems rather than constructing
its own poles or conduits. 2 In the majority of cases, CATV companies
use leasing arrangements known as pole attachment agreements to acquire access to utility poles. 3 These arrangements involve a rental of a
portion of communication space4 on existing utility poles for the attach1. CATV systems consist of three components: (1) a receiving station which picks up
signals transmitted by television and radio; (2) "headend" equipment which converts the signals so that they can be retransmitted along coaxial cable; and (3) a
coaxial cable distribution system which carries programming from the headend
equipment to the homes of the subscribers. General Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d
390, 393 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969). The cable distribution system, the third component, consists of three parts: (1) a trunk cable which runs from
the headend equipment to the utility poles; (2) distribution cables which carry the
signal from pole to pole; and (3) "drop lines" running from the utility poles to the
subscribers' homes. /d. Although these cables are usually attached to utility poles,
they may also be run underground. See Continental Cablevision v. American Elec.
Power Co., 715 F.2d 1115, 1116 (6th Cir. 1983); Seigel, The History of Cable Television Pole Attachment Regulation, 4 COMM. LAW. 9, 9 (1984).
2. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
3. The term "pole attachment" refers to any attachment by a cable television system to
a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a power utility or a
telephone company. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (a)(4) (1982). The phrase "owners of utility
poles" refers to poles owned or under the control of both power companies and
telephone companies. It does not include any railroad, any cooperative organization or any person owned by any state or federal government. /d. § 224(a)(1).
4. Generally, utility poles have between 11 and 16 feet of "usable space" for power and
communication equipment. See In re Adoption of Rules for the Regulation of
Cable Television Pole Attachments, 77 F.C.C.2d 187, 191-93 (1980); S. REP. No.
580, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 20, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 109, 128. "Usable space" means the space above the minimum grade level
which can be used for the attachment of wires, cables and associated equipment. 47
U.S.C. § 224(d)(2) (1982). The usable space is rebuttably presumed to be 13.5 feet.
See In re Adoption of the Rules for the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 72 F.C.C.2d 59, 69 (1979). Five feet of pole space is typically required for
power equipment with the remaining space being divided between communication
services. Although the actual cable used for the distribution of CATV programming occupies only one inch of this space, CATV systems are deemed to occupy one
foot of usable space. Monongahela Power Co. v. F. C. C., 655 F.2d 1254, 1256 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (one foot of space attributable to CATV is reasonable), aff'g In re Adop-
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ment of cable distribution equipment owned by CATV operators. In
other cases, leasing arrangements known as channel service offerings
have been employed to distribute cable programming. Under channel
service arrangements, telephone companies own the equipment necessary
for· cable distribution and furnish channel services to CATV operators. s
CATV operators use this distribution service for a fee in lieu of pole attachment agreements.
Because of anticompetitive behavior by the owners of utility poles,
CATV operators were often unable to secure either pole attachments or
channel service offerings, or were unable to prevent owners from imposing unreasonably high rents for pole attachments. 6 To prevent anticompetitive behavior and encourage nation-wide distribution of CATV,
Congress enacted, and the FCC promulgated, restrictions designed to
eliminate predatory practices involving CATV access to utility poles and
conduits. One restriction promulgated by the FCC, known as the crossownership rules, prohibits telephone companies from owning, either directly or through affiliates, cable television systems within their telephone
service areas. 7 A second restriction, the Communications Act Amendments of 1978, 8 ("Pole Attachment Act") empowers the FCC with the
authority to ensure that the rates, terms and conditions of pole attachment agreements are "just and reasonable." 9
The success these restrictions have had on the CATV industry is
evidenced by CATV's evolution into a mature industry. 10 This market
maturity, and consequent economic stability of the CATV industry, how-

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

tion of Rules for the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 77 F.C.C.2d
187, 188-91 (1980); S. REP. No. 580, supra, at 20, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 128. See generally Seigel, supra note 1, at 10.
See In re General Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 448, 449 (1968), ajf'd sub nom. General
Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
See infra notes 20-24, 115-127 and accompanying text.
See The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98
Stat. 2779, 2785 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (Supp. IV 1986)); 47 C.P.R.
§§ 63.54-63.58 (1988); see also In re General Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C. 2d 448 (1968),
ajf'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 888 (1969); 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1982). See generally In re Applications of
Telephone Common Carriers for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, reconsidered in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), ajf'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971); In reApplications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated
Community Antenna Television Systems, 34 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (1969) (notice of proposed rule making).
Communications Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6, 92 Stat. 33, 35
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) [hereinafter Pole Attachment
Act].
47 u.s.c. § 224(b)(1) (1982).
The FCC has estimated that approximately 80 percent of the nation's homes are
now able to receive cable television. This figure is up almost 65 percent from the
mid 1970's. Approximately 51 percent of the nation's television households actually
subscribe to cable television service. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-63.58, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 5849, 5851-52,

1988]

Equal Access to Pole Attachment Agreements

167

ever, recently led the FCC to reconsider the continued viability of the
cross-ownership rules. 11 As a result of this inquiry, the FCC has tentatively concluded that a relaxation of the restrictions on telephone-cable
company affiliation "would result in greater, not lesser, competition in
cable television service and, therefore, in greater public interest benefits
to consumers." 12
This comment reviews the combination of factors that prompted the
need for the Pole Attachment Act and examines the jurisdictional development of pole attachment regulation. Next, the history of the crossownership rules is explored. This section also examines the developments that have occurred since the rules' enactment and analyzes the
impact that relaxing the cross-ownership rules would have on access to
pole attachments under the current statutory framework. Finally, new
rules are advocated that would ensure equal access to pole space for independent CATV systems.
II.

POLE ATTACHMENT REGULATION

A.

The Need for Government Regulation

A significant number of pole attachment agreements had been negotiated prior to enactment of the Pole Attachment Act. 13 Eventually,
however, internal conflicts and external forces prompted the need for
government intervention. For example, a gross inequality in bargaining
power between the CATV industry and the utility industry resulted in
disputes over the rates, terms and conditions of pole attachments. 14 Similarly, a jurisdictional impasse between the FCC and the states left
CATV companies without a forum for the review and resolution of pole
attachment rate disputes.
Two factors initially contributed to the inequity of bargaining position between CATV companies and utility companies. First, the CATV
industry depends on pole attachments as a means of cable broadcasting

11.
12.
13.
14.

5853 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655, 4658.
See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections
63.54-63.58, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. 5092 (1987) (notice of inquiry).
In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections 63.5463.58, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 5849, 5849 (1988) (further notice of inquiry and notice of proposed rule making).
The FCC has estimated that over 7,800 CATV pole attachment agreements had
been entered into prior to the enactment of the Pole Attachments Act. S. REP. No.
580, supra note 4, at 12, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 120.
As of July 1977, pole attachment disputes existed in 27 states. These disputes arose
as the result of the escalating cost of pole attachment agreements. During the period immediately preceding July 1977, pole attachment rates increased 55 percent
with the average cost of a pole attachment rising from $3.90 to $6.05 per pole. See
H.R. REP. No. 751, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 5 (1977). Service to many CATV
subscribers was interrupted as a result of these disputes. See H.R. REP. No. 751,
supra, at 3; 123 CONG. REC. 35,008 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1977) (remarks of Cong.
Broyhill).
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distribution. 15 CATV industry reliance on these lease arrangements, as
opposed to installation of its own poles, was not entirely voluntary.
Rather, the CATV industry was virtually forced to use these arrangements because of "practical, economic, and aesthetic reasons." 16 Practically, installation of CATV poles would have been a wasteful duplication
of resources because space on existing utility poles was not being fully
utilized. 17 Economically, the cost of leasing the space needed by CATV
systems was much less than the cost of erecting separate utility poles. 18
Finally, a duplication of utility poles and wires would create a "haphazard mesh on the skyline." 19
The second factor leading to the disparate bargaining positions of
the parties involved the telephone and power companies' domination of
ownership and control of the poles necessary for attachment. 20
Although pole attachment agreements provided income to the utility
from an otherwise surplus portion of plant, the utility companies recognized that this source of income was not as vital to them as the pole
attachment agreements were to the CATV companies. 21 In addition, telephone companies were often reluctant, occasionally to the point of employing anticompetitive practices, 22 to negotiate competitive pole
15. See 123 CoNG. REc. 35,008 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1977) (remarks of Cong. Broyhill).
Prior to the enactment of the Pole Attachment Act, cable television companies
owned or controlled less than one percent of the over 10 million poles to which
CATV lines were attached. S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 13, 1978 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 121. Power companies owned or controlled 53 percent
of the utility poles involved in attachment agreements. Telephone companies controlled the majority of the remaining poles. See id.
16. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Maryland/Delaware Cable Tel. Ass'n, 310 Md.
553, 556, 530 A.2d 734, 736 (1987).
17. See supra note 4.
18. See, e.g., Cable Information Serv., Inc. v. Appalachian Power Co., 81 F.C.C.2d 383,
387-89 ( 1980) (net cost of a bare pole was found to be approximately $114, whereas
the maximum rental fee was found to be under $2); Teleprompter of Fairmont v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 79 F.C.C.2d 232, 236-37 (1980) (net cost of a bare
pole was found to be $90.30, whereas the maximum rental fee was found to be under
$2).
19. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 310 Md. at 560, 530 A.2d at 738; see also H.R.
REP. No. 751, supra note 14, at 2; 123 CONG. REC. 35,008 (daily Ed. Oct. 25, 1977)
(remarks of Cong. Broyhill).
20. See supra note 15.
21. S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 16, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
124.
22. See, e.g., TV Signal Co. v. AT & T, 462 F.2d 1256, 1259 (8th Cir. 1972) (telephone
company refused to grant franchised CATV operator a pole attachment agreement
but offered a restricted lease-back service); In re Dimension Cable TV, Inc., 25
F.C.C.2d 520 (1970) (telephone company impermissibly constructed CATV channel
facilities under the guise of a separate corporation without obtaining requisite 214
certification); In re TeleCable Corp., 19 F.C.C.2d 574 (1969) (telephone company
refused to negotiate pole attachments and increased the rental of existing agreements from $3.00 to $4.50 in order to promote its channel distribution service); In
re General Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 448,462-63 (1969) (by reason of their control over
utility poles, telephone companies were in a position to preclude or delay an unaffiliated CATV system from commencing service), aff'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v.
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attachment leases because of a desire to develop and utilize their own
cable access distribution systems. 23 Accordingly, the utility companies
were "unquestionably in a position to extract monopoly rents from the
CATV systems in the form of unreasonably high pole attachment
rents." 24
The combination of utility monopoly power and CATV dependence
inevitably resulted in disputes between the parties over the availability
and conditions of pole attachment agreements. 25 Unable to resolve these
disputes amoung themselves, the parties, particularly the CATV industry, sought resolution of the disputes in the courts.
At the federal level, the parties looked to the Federal Communications Commission for the resolution of pole attachment disputes. Beginning in 1966 with In re California Water & Telephone Co., 26 the FCC
began a ten year examination of the extent and nature of its jurisdiction
over pole attachment agreements. Initially, the FCC asserted jurisdiction over pole attachment agreements which involved only telephone
companies. 27 Basing its decision on a broad interpretation of the Communications Act of 1934, 28 and on judicial interpretation of the Act, 29
the FCC reasoned that telephone company pole attachments were inci-

23.

24.
2S.

26.
27.
28.

29.

F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969); see also infra
notes 11S-127 and accompanying text.
Although telephone companies are prohibited, directly or through their affiliates,
from furnishing CATV service in their telephone service area, they are permitted to
provide channel service offerings to unaffiliated CATV operators. In a channel service offering, the telephone company owns the distribution equipment and leases
channels of communication to the CATV operator for a fee in lieu of pole attachment agreements. However, before the telephone companies provide such a distribution service, they must offer to make pole attachment access available to the
CATV operator. See In reApplication of Telephone Companies for Section 214
certificates for channel facilities furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Televi- ·
sion Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970), aff'd sub nom., General Tel. Co. v. United
States, 449 F.2d 846 (Sth Cir. 1971); 47 C.P.R. § 63.S7 (1988); see also infra note
130 and accompanying text. See generally Paragon Cable Tel., Inc. v. F.C.C., 822
F.2d 1S2, ISS (D.C. Cir. 1987).
S. REP. No. S80, supra note 4, at 13, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
121.
See, e.g., In re Continental Cablevision of N.H., Inc., 4S F.C.C.2d 10S8 (1974) (dispute over "first-come, first-serve" policy regarding make-ready costs for pole attachments); In re Better TV of Dutchess County, N.Y., Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 939, 944
(1971) (allegation that telephone company discriminated in denying CATV operator
access to duct space).
S F.C.C.2d 229 (1966). The pole attachment investigation arose out of the same
proceedings which led to the development of the cross-ownership rules. See infra
notes 102, 104 and accompanying text.
In re California Water & Tel. Co., 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970).
The statutory basis upon which the FCC relied was section 1S2(a) of title 47 of the
United States Code which confers jurisdiction to the FCC over "all interstate and
foreign communication by wire or radio." 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986); see also id. §§ 1S1, 1S3(a)-(b) ( 1982).
The judicial basis rested on the Supreme Court's interpretation of FCC authority to
regulate cable television in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 1S7,
167-68 ( 1968) (FCC has broad authority to regulate "all forms of electrical commu-
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dental to transmission by wire or radio, and were therefore within its
jurisdiction. 30
In 1977, however, the FCC reversed its initial decision, finding that
it had no jurisdiction under the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate
pole attachment agreements between CATV companies and telephone
companies. 31 This change in jurisdictional policy evolved for two reasons. First, the Commission reasoned that although it possessed broad
powers to regulate all forms of communication, the fact that pole attachment agreements were necessary to the CATV industry was not sufficient
to bring the agreements within the FCC's authority. 32 Second, the Commission concluded that since there was a division of ownership and control of the poles between power and telephone companies, 33 it would be
irrational and ineffective to assert jurisdiction over telephone pole attachments while not asserting jurisdiction over power company pole attachments.34 Accordingly, disputes over pole attachment rates and
conditions could not be resolved on a federal level.
While the FCC was in the process of determining that it lacked the
necessary authority to regulate pole attachment agreements, jurisdictional issues were also being addressed at the state level. The state
courts, however, proved to be an inadequate forum for the resolution of
pole attachment disputes. Although employing a slightly different analysis than the FCC, 35 a number of state courts also refused jurisdiction
over such disputes. 36 Generally, these states concluded that pole attachment agreements were neither a public utility service, 37 nor sufficiently

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

37.

nications, whether by telephone, telegraph, cable, or radio.") (quoting S. REP. No.
781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934)).
California Water, 21 F.C.C.2d at 327. For a more detailed analysis of this decision,
see Seigel, supra note 1, at 10-13.
In re California Water & Tel. Co., 40 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 419 (1977).
Id. at 425-26.
See supra note 15.
California Water, 40 Rad. Reg.2d at 426-27.
Compare In re California Water & Tel. Co., 40 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 419 (1977)
(denial of jurisdiction because pole attachments did not constitute wire or radio
communications) with Ceracche Tel. Corp., v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 49 Misc.2d
554, 267 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) (denial of jurisdiction because pole
attachments did not constitute a public service).
See, e.g., In re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 65 Pub. Util. Rep.3d (PUR) 117, 120
(Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1966) (in absence of legislation specifically granting jurisdiction, public service commission had no jurisdiction over pole attachments); Consolidated Cable Serv., Inc. v. Leary, 382 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1964) (court lacked power
to compel public corporation to allow anyone to use its poles); Ceracche Tel. Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 49 Misc.2d 554, 267 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960)
(regulation of CATV is a question for the legislature, not the courts); WCOG, Inc.,
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 64 Pub. Util. Rep.3d (PUR) 314, 318 (N.C. Util.
Comm'n 1966) (because a pole attachment is a private use of surplus facilities, it is
beyond the commission's authority).
See International Cable TV Corp. v. All Metal Fabricators, Inc., 66 Pub. Util.
Rep.3d (PUR) 446, 463 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1966) (in the absence of a public
offering, pole attachments do not constitute a public utility service).
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related to public utility services, 38 to come within the ambit of the state
regulatory commissions' authority. 39
Thus, the CATV industry was faced with a two-fold problem. First,
it lacked the bargaining power necessary to prevent unreasonable and
arbitrary pole attachment practices by utility pole owners. Second, it
lacked an available forum where these practices could come under review. The solution to the CATV industry's problems rested on legislative intervention. The result was the adoption of the Pole Attachment
Act of 1978.40

B.

The Dual Regulatory Policy of the Pole Attachment Act

With the enactment of the Pole Attachment Act, Congress introduced a comprehensive plan of regulation designed to redress the
problems associated with pole attachment agreements. One of the central purposes of this legislation was the establishment of a mechanism to
assure the availability of a forum for the review and resolution of pole
attachment disputes. 41 The mechanism which resulted produced a dual
system of federal and state regulation over pole attachment agreements.
1.

Federal Regulation

Section 224(b) of the Pole Attachment Act empowers the FCC with
the regulatory authority to hear disputes arising over the rates, terms and
conditions of pole attachment agreements. 42 Although not amounting to
a classification of pole attachments as "wire or radio communications,"
the Pole Attachment Act expands the FCC's authority to include entities43 and practices44 not otherwise subject to FCC regulation. 45 This
expansion of jurisdictional authority enables the FCC to hear pole attachment disputes regardless of who owns or controls the poles subject to
attachment. 46
The Pole Attachment Act also empowers the FCC with the authority to ensure that the rates, terms and conditions of pole attachment
agreements are "just and reasonable." 47 Specifically, Congress mandated
38. See Ceracche Tel., 49 Misc.2d at 557,267 N.Y.S.2d at 972-73 (rental of pole space
by company to a CATV operator is not part of the public service performed by a
company in the business of telephonic communications).
39. For a more detailed analysis of each of the states rulings, see Seigel, supra note 1, at
13-16.
40. Communications Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6, 92 Stat. 33, 35
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
41. S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 14, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
122.
42. 47 u.s.c. § 224(b)(1) (1982).
43. Principally, power utilities. See S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 15, 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 123.
44. Principally, intrastate practices of power utilities. See id.
45. /d.
46. /d.
47. 47 u.s.c. § 224(b)(1) (1982).
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a range of just and reasonable rates that:
[A]ssures a utility the recovery of not less than the additional
costs of providing pole attachments, nor more than an amount
determined by multiplying the percentage of the total usable
space ... which is occupied by the pole attachment by the sum
of the operating expenses and actual capital costs of the utility
attributable to the entire pole.... 48
Pursuant to this authority, the FCC established the following formula to
determine the maximum49 just and reasonable rate for pole attachments:
Maximum Rate = [Space Occupied by CATV/Total Usable
Space] X [Operating Expenses + Capital Cost of Poles)5°
In practice, however, the FCC employs a slightly different formula. Instead of expressing operating expenses and capital costs of poles directly
as dollar amounts, the FCC expresses these costs as a percentage of net
pole investment. 5 1 Thus, the operating expenses and capital· costs of
poles are normally determined from the net cost of a bare pole multiplied
by the carrying charges attributable to the cost of owning a pole. The
product of this calculation is then multiplied by the percentage of space
used by the cable operator. The formula actually used by the FCC in
computing the maximum rate for pole attachments is as follows:
Maximum Rate = [Space Occupied by CATV/Total Usable
Space] X [Net Cost of a Bare Pole] X [Carrying Charges).5 2
48. /d. § 224(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also 124 CONG. REC. 1598 (daily ed.
Jan. 31, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Hollings); 123 CONG. REc. 35,007-08 (daily ed. Oct.
25, 1977) (remarks of Cong. Wirth). This formula produces a zone of reasonableness between incremental costs incurred by the utility as a result of the cable attachments and fully allocated costs incurred by the utility in owning the poles regardless
of the presence of cable. See S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 19, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 127. The FCC, however, is not permitted to chose any
figure which falls within the zone of reasonableness and set its rate there. Rather,
the FCC must reach a "rational decision through rational means." See Texas
Power & Light Co. v. F.C.C., 784 F.2d 1265, 1269 (5th Cir. 1986); Alabama Power
Co. v. F.C.C., 773 F.2d 362, 366-67 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
49. Virtually all of the complaints involving rate disputes are filed by the cable companies and allege that a utility is charging a rate in excess of the maximum level. As a
result, the Commission focuses on the maximum rate allowable under the Pole Attachment Act. The pole attachment rate determined by the FCC formula, therefore, is rebuttably presumed to fall above the minimum statutory rate. See In re
Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing the Attachment of Cable Hardware to
Utility Poles, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. 4387, 4394 (1987); 47 C.P.R. § 1.1409(b) (1988).
50. See In re Adoption of Rules for the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 72 F.C.C.2d 59, 70 (1979) (second report and order); In re Adoption of
Rules for the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 68 F.C.C.2d 1585,
1605 (1978) (first report and order); see also 47 C.P.R. § 1.1409(c) (1988).
51. See 47 C.P.R. § 1.1404(g)(9) (1988).
52. See Alabama Power Co. v. F.C.C., 773 F.2d 363, 364-65 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re
Cable Information Serv., Inc., 81 F.C.C.2d 383, 386 (1980). For purposes of this
formula, space occupied by the CATV system is rebuttably presumed to be one foot
and total usable space is rebuttably presumed to be 13.5 feet. See supra note 4. The
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This FCC rate determination formula has recently come under judicial scrutiny in Alabama Power Co. v. F.C.C. 53 In Alabama Power, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined
that the FCC rate formula methodology did not result in the calculation
of the maximum just and reasonable rate allowable under the Pole Attachment Act. 54 In addition to finding that the FCC made several mathematical and conceptual errors, the court held that the Commission had
improperly excluded the expenses incurred by the utility in providing
guy wires and anchors in determining the figure for the net cost of
poles, 55 and that the Commission's decision to deny the use of the normalized tax method in calculating the carrying charges was arbitrary and
capricious. 56 In response to this decision, the FCC modified its practices
and formulas for computing maximum allowable rates for pole attachment agreements. 57

53.
54.
55.
56.

57.

percentage used for computing carrying charges is determined from the sum of the
percentage of pole investment devoted to each of five categories of expenses: administration, maintenance, taxes, depreciation, and cost of capital. See Alabama Power,
773 F.2d at 369; Cable Information Serv., 81 F.C.C.2d at 389. The net cost of a bare
pole is determined by subtracting the depreciation reserve related to poles, the accumulated deferred taxes related to poles and the amount attributable to "non-cablerelated investment" from the gross investment in pole plant and dividing this figure
by the number of poles involved in the attachment. See Alabama Power, 773 F.2d at
365; Hardware Attachment Amendments, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. at 4388, 4402. Non-cablerelated investment is rebuttably presumed to be 5 percent of net pole investment for
telephone companies and 15 percent of net pole investment for power utilities. /d.
at 4389-90. Finally, net pole investment equals gross pole investment minus the
depreciation reserve related to poles minus the accumulated deferred income taxes
related to poles. /d. at 4402.
773 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
/d. at 367-72.
/d. at 368-69.
/d. at 370-71. The court arrived at this conclusion because of the Commission's
inconsistent prior decisions concerning the use of the normalized method for tax
computation. See Texas Power & Light Co. v. F.C.C., 784 F.2d 1265, 1270-72 (5th
Cir. 1986) (non-normalized taxed component is inconsistent with the depreciation
component in the Commission's formula and results in inconsistent and arbitrary
rates). Compare Television Cable Serv., Inc. v. Monongahela Power Co., 88
F.C.C.2d 56, 59 (1981) (denying the use of the normalized tax method) with Second
Computer Inquiry, No. 81-893 (released May 15, 1985) (permitting the use of the
normalized tax method).
The FCC has made the following adjustments to the rate formula: (1) Non-polerelated investment is rebuttably presumed to be 5 percent for telephone companies
and 15 percent for power utilities; (2) a credit or offset for guys and anchors provided by a cable company will be allowed only where the cable operator demonstrates that the guy or anchor benefits the utility or other pole users and the cable
operator is obligated to provide such equipment under an agreement with the utility
pole owner; (3) a ratio of total administrative and general expenses to total plant
investment will be used to determine the percentage of investment devoted to pole
attachment administrative and general carrying charges; (4) a separate charge or fee
for items such as application processing or maintenance inspection will be offset
against the annual rental fee or credited to the cable company if these costs are
found to be already included in the utilities carrying charges; (5) a normalized tax
calculation will be employed in determining the operating expenses and capital costs
of the utility incurred as a result of owning and maintaining its poles; and (6) the
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The constitutional validity of the Pole Attachment Act came under
scrutiny in.F.C.C. v. Florida Power Co. 58 In Florida Power, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the FCC rate determination
formula amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property without just
compensation. 59 Reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, 60 the Supreme Court found that the rate-limiting regulations of the Pole Attachment Act constituted neither a per se taking of
the utilities property, 61 nor a taking under traditional fifth amendment
standards. 62
In deciding the per se taking issue, the Court compared the provisions of the Pole Attachment Act to the standards for a per se taking
previously announced in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp. 63 Loretto involved a New York statute which was held to constitute a per se taking because it required landlords to permit permanent
occupation of their property by CATV companies. 64 The Florida Power
Court, however, concluded that this per se rule was inapplicable to the
Pole Attachment Act because the FCC did not require the power companies to provide pole attachment access to the CATV companies. 65
The Florida Power Court next addressed the issue of whether the
Pole Attachment Act effected a taking of property under traditional fifth
amendment standards. Finding that the formula used by the FCC to
determine the rate in question was not confiscatory, 66 the Court held that
the FCC order was a permissible regulation of rents rather than a
taking. 67
Thus, the Pole Attachment Act grants broad powers of regulation to

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.

presumption that the rate calculated under the FCC formula is just and reasonable
may be rebutted by presenting evidence, on a case-by-case basis, which demonstrates that the pole attachment contract contains particularly onerous provisions.
See Hardware Attachment Amendments, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. at 4389-97; In re Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing the Attachment of Cable Television Hardware to Utility Poles, No. 88-421 (released Jan. 9, 1989).
480 u.s. 245 (1987).
/d. at 248-50.
Florida Power Co. v. F.C.C., 772 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 480 U.S. 245
(1987) (per curiam).
Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 250-53.
/d. at 253-54.
458 u.s. 419 (1982).
/d. at 425-41.
Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 252; see also infra note 69.
As long as the rates are not confiscatory, it is constitutionally permissible under the
Fifth Amendment to limit the maximum rate chargeable from the use of private
property for public concerns. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
768-70 (1968).
Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 253-54; cf Rural Tel. Coalition v. F.C.C., 838 F.2d 1307,
1313 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (allocation of25% of local phone exchange costs to interstate
jurisdiction did not constitute a confiscation of long-distance telephone carrier's
property). For a detailed discussion of the Florida Power case, see Comment, The
Constitutionality of Pole Attachment Legislation: Not a Taking, But a Valid Regulation of Cable Television, 17 Sw. U.L. REV. 321 (1987).
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the FCC for resolving pole attachment disputes. The legislative history
of the Pole Attachment Act, however, indicates several restrictions on
the scope of this authority. First, jurisdiction can be established only
where space on utility poles has been reserved for communication facilities and is presently occupied by a communication system. 68 Second, the
FCC does not have the authority to guarantee access to pole attachments
for CATV systems, nor can it require a power utility to dedicate a portion of its poles for communication space. 69 Finally, the FCC arguably
does not have the authority to involve itself directly in the agreements
entered into between the parties. Rather, FCC involvement will occur
only in terms of resolving disputes which the parties bring before it. 70
2.

State Preemption of FCC Jurisdiction

In addition to the jurisdictional limitations previously discussed,
FCC authority can be preempted by individual state regulation. Congress has "recognized the 'inherent power of a State' to regulate pole
attachment contracts and intended to provide a forum for litigation concerning such contracts only in cases where no state forum was
available." 71
Section 224(c) of the Pole Attachment Act provides the mechanism
whereby states may obtain jurisdiction over the regulation of pole attachment agreements. 72 To preempt federal jurisdiction, each state must certify to the FCC that:
68. See In re Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing the Attachment of Cable
Hardware to Utility Poles, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. 4387, 4397-98, 4404 (1987); S. REP. No.
580, supra note 4, at 15, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 123; 124
CONG. REc. 1598 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Hollings); 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.1404(d)(l)-(2) (1988); see also Cable Information Serv., Inc. v. Appalachian
Power Co., 81 F.C.C.2d 383, 391 (1980).
69. See Florida Power, 480 U.S. at 251 n.6 ("The language of the Act provides no explicit authority to the FCC to require pole access for cable operators, and the legislative history strongly suggest that Congress intended no such authorization."); In
re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 65 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 3d (PUR) 117 (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1966); S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 15-16, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 123-24; see also Paragon Cable Tel., Inc. v. F.C.C., 822 F.2d 152,
154 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (court recognized, but did not decide, whether the FCC
had authority to compel a utility to make pole attachment agreements); cf Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (act which authorized a permanent physical occupation of property without just compensation was
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment).
70. S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 15, 22, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 123, 130. But see 47 C.F.R. § 1.1403(a) (1988) (a utility is required to provide a
CATV system operator with no less than 60 days notice prior to (1) removal of
facilities or termination of any service to those facilities if the cause or the termination arises out of a rate, term or condition of a pole attachment, or (2) any increase
in pole attachment rates).
·
71. Utah Cable Tel. Operators Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 656 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah
1982).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(l)-(3) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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(1) it regulates the terms, rates and conditions for pole attachments; and
(2) in so regulating, it has the authority to consider and does
consider the interests of both the subscribers and the consumers of utility service. 73
Further, the state must implement its regulatory authority by issuing effective rules and regulations, 74 and it must take final action on all complaints within a prescribed period of time. 75
This certification procedure is designed to ensure that a forum is
available for dispute resolution and that the state is willing and able to
provide this forum. Thus, even if a state has the required authority, FCC
certification will be denied if the state is not regulating or prepared to
regulate upon request. 76 The FCC, however, does not have the authority
to review the viability of the regulatory framework developed by the
state, nor can it question a state's underlying base of authority. 77 Rather,
these issues are left to judicial resolution within each particular state.
C.

The Battle for State Regulation

The FCC may consider a petition for certification as conclusive of a
state's preemptive authority to regulate, but the state which has received
certification may still deny jurisdiction. 78 The individual state's responsi73. /d. at§ 224(c)(2)(A)-(B); see also 124 CoNG. REc. 1598-99 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. Hollings).
74. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1986); see also The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 4, 98 Stat. 2779, 2801. The FCC requires
that when a state requests certification, it must certify that its rates and regulations
include a specific methodology, which has been made publicly available in the state,
for regulating pole attachments. 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 18,656-57 (May 2, 1985).
However, the Commission has found that it does not possess the authority to define
the specific methodology to be followed by the states, nor the responsibility to determine whether the state's specific methodology comports with the requirements of
section 224(c). ld. at 18,657.
75. 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(3)(B)(i),(ii) (Supp. IV 1986); see also The Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 4, 98 Stat. 2779, 2801-02. A state public
service commission must take final action on a pole attachment complaint within
180 days after the complaint is filed, or within the applicable period prescribed for
such final action, if the prescribed period does not extend beyond 360 days after the
filing of such complaint. 47 U.S.C. § 224 (c)(3)(B)(i),(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
76. S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 17, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
125.
77. ld. The FCC may question a state certification request only where there is evidence
that a party is unable to file a complaint with the state public service commission, or
where the state public service commission fails to issue a determination on a complaint within 180 days of filing or within the period prescribed for final action in the
state. In reCertification by the Louisiana Public Service Commission Concerning
Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 1 F.C.C.Rcd. 522 (1986); 50 Fed.
Reg. 18,637, 18,657 (May 2, 1985).
78. Five state courts have found that their public service commissions do not have authority to assert jurisdiction over pole attachment agreements. American Cable
Tel., Inc. v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 143 Ariz. 273, 693 P.2d 928 (1983); Teleprompter Corp. v. Hawkins, 384 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1980); Illinois-Indiana Cable Tel.
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bility is to determine whether or not it possesses sufficient authority to
satisfy the certification requirements of the FCC. 7 9 This requires the
state to examine its own regulatory body's statutory basis for asserting
jurisdiction and for considering the needs of CATV subscribers and utility customers. 80 These examinations have produced mixed results; a
number of states have allowed their public service commissions to regulate pole attachments, 81 while others have denied their commission's authority and returned the regulatory responsibility to the FCC. 82
The rationale of the courts which permit their public service commissions to regulate pole attachments, in the absence of specific legislative authority, 83 is best espoused in Louisiana Cablevision v. Louisiana
Public Service Commission. 84 In Louisiana Cablevision, the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that because of the potential for pole attachments
to disrupt the safe and continued delivery of electric and telephonic serv:ices to its citizens, Louisiana's public service commission's authority
"must necessarily extend to ... oversight of the growing use of utility
poles for cable [attachment]." 85 Further, the court reasoned that the revenues generated by pole attachments directly affect a utility's calculation
of rates, thereby bringing pole attachments within the public service
commission's duty to ensure fair utility rates. 86
Having concluded that the public service commission possessed the
power to regulate the rates, terms and conditions of pole attachment
agreements, the court analyzed whether the public service commission
had authority to consider the interests of CATV subscribers. 87 The court

79.
80.
81.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 427 N.E.2d 1100 (Ind. App. 1981); Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co. v. Maryland/Delaware Cable Tel. Ass'n, 310 Md. 553, 530 A.2d
734 (1987); In re New England Cable Tel. Ass'n, 126 N.H. 149, 489 A.2d 124
(1985).
See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
Because pole attachment agreements involve utilities, the typical regulatory body is
a public service commission or a public utilities commission. For purposes of this
comment, public service commission will encompass both terms.
Seven state courts have found that their public service commissions have sufficient
authority to assert jurisdiction over pole attachment agreements. Cable Tel. Co. v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 82 Ill. App.3d 814, 403 N.E.2d 287 (1980); Kentucky
CATV Ass'n v. Volz, 675 S.W.2d 393 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983); Louisiana Cablevision v.
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 493 So.2d 555 (La. 1986); Consumers Power Co. v.
Telesystems, Inc., 96 Mich. App. 1, 292 N.W.2d 472 (1980); Las Cruces TV Cable
v. New Mexico Corporate Comm'n, 102 N.M. 720, 699 P.2d 1072 (1985); General
Tel. Co., v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 63 A.D.2d 93, 406 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1978); Utah
Cable Tel. Operators Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 656 P.2d 398 (Utah 1982).
See supra note 78.
See, e.g., Utah Cable Tel. Operators Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 656 P.2d 398
(Utah 1982) (legislation specifically granting authority to their public service commission for the regulation of pole attachment agreements).
493 So.2d 555 (La. 1986).
Id. at 558; see also Kentucky CATV, 675 S.W.2d at 396-97; General Tel., 63 A.D.2d
at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
Louisiana Cablevision, 493 So.2d at 558; see also Kentucky CATV, 675 S.W.2d at
396; General Tel., 63 A.D.2d at 97, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 911-12.
Louisiana Cablevision, 493 So.2d at 558.
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found that the authority to regulate pole attachments existed within the
commission's responsibility to ensure just and reasonable rates for utilities. This responsibility required the public service commission to balance the interests of the CATV subscribers with those of the utility
customers. 88 With both provisions of the FCC certification requirements
satisfied, the court concluded that the public service commission had successfully preempted federal jurisdiction for pole attachment regulation. 89
Although a common rationale developed among those states which
have asserted jurisdiction over pole attachment disputes, the disparity in
the underlying grant of power to each state's public service commission
has contributed to a greater divergence in rationale among those states
which have denied jurisdiction. Nonetheless, several dominant themes
have been followed by state courts which have concluded that their regulatory bodies lacked authority to regulate pole attachments. These
themes are best exemplified in Illinois-Indiana Cable Television Ass'n v.
Public Service Commission. 90 Echoing the rationale employed by state
courts in pre-Pole Attachment Act cases, 91 the court found that the attachment of cable to utility poles was not sufficiently related to the business of producing electric and telephonic services to be considered a
public utility service and, therefore, was outside the realm of their public
service commission's jurisdiction. 92 The court added that although the
public service commission had authority to regulate pole attachments in
order to "ensure the safe operations of a utility and to ensure uninterrupted service," the current practice of attaching cable to utility poles
presented no such dangers. 93 As further support for its position, the
court explained that the decision to regulate pole attachments was a leg88. /d. at 558-59; see also Kentucky CATV, 675 S.W.2d at 397.
89. Louisiana Cablevision, 493 So.2d at 559. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not
address the issue of whether the Louisiana public service commission had made
effective rules and regulations implementing its regulatory authority over pole attachments. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. The FCC, however, in
In reCertification by the Louisiana Public Service Commission Concerning Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, 1 F.C.C.Rcd. 522 (1986), found that
there was no allegation of an inability to file a complaint with the Louisiana public
service commission nor was there any evidence that a complaint had been pending
with the commission longer than the 180-day period. /d. The FCC concluded,
therefore, that the request was proper and pole attachment jurisdiction would vest
with the Louisiana public service commission. Id.
90. 427 N.E.2d 1100 (Ind. App. 1981).
91. See supra text and accompanying notes 35-39.
92. Illinois-Indiana Cable, 427 N.E.2d at 1109-11; see also Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.
Co. v. Maryland/Delaware Cable Tel. Ass'n, 310 Md. 553, 561-64, 530 A.2d 734,
738-39 (1987) ("[T]he use of utility poles for the suspension of cable television lines
is not an essential service provided to the entire public, but is instead an incidental
service provided to only a few private parties. Consequently, it is not a 'public utility service.'"); American Cable Tel., Inc. v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 143 Ariz.
App. 273, 278, 693 P.2d 928, 933 (1983) ("[W]e do not find that pole attachment
licenses granted by [a utility company] are public utility services.").
93. Illinois-Indiana Cable, 427 N.E.2d at 1107.
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islative, rather than a judicial determination. 94 As a final basis for denying jurisdiction, the court noted the availability of a federal forum for the
resolution of the disputes between the parties. 95 Consequently, the petitioners were required to litigate their pole attachment claim at the federal
level. 96
Thus, the Pole Attachment Act has succeeded in assuring that at
least one forum will be available for the resolution of pole attachment
disputes. Similarly, the Act's rate determination formula has ameliorated some of the anticompetitive potential surrounding pole attachment
agreements. The Pole Attachment Act, however, has not proven successful in assuring pole access to CATV operators in all cases. Instead,
the CATV industry has had to rely upon rules which prohibit telephone
company participation in the CATV business to minimize the pole access
problem.
III.

A.

TELEPHONE COMPANY-CABLE TELEVISION CROSSOWNERSHIP RULES

Regulation of Channel Service Offerings

For more than twenty years, the FCC has found it necessary to regulate telephone company involvement in the cable television industry.
The cross-ownership rules, 97 which presently prohibit telephone companies from providing cable television within their service areas, however,
were not the genesis of this regulatory intervention. Rather, the crossownership rules evolved from the FCC's regulation of cable distribution
services furnished by the telephone companies to CATV operators.
· The FCC began its regulation of cable distribution service in April
1966 when it directed several telephone companies to file tariffs for channel service offerings made to CATV operators. 98 Channel service offer94. Id. at 1112; see also Teleprompter Corp. v. Hawkins, 384 So.2d 648, 650 (Fla. 1980)
(" '(C)ommunity antenna television systems have never been defined as 'public utilities' by the legislature, nor is there anything ... which would justify the conclusion
that such systems are vested with a public interest; in actual fact, they may be of
such character as to justify public regulation and control. That, however, is a matter for determination by the state legislature.'") (quoting In re Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 65 Pub. Util. Rep.3d (PUR) 117, 119-20 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1966)).
95. Illinois-Indiana Cable, 427 N.E.2d at 1112. The court's reliance on the availability
of a federal forum as a basis for denying jurisdiction is misplaced. The legislative
history of the Pole Attachment Act reveals that Congress intended that state governments should have the sole responsibility for regulatory oversight of pole attachment agreements. SeeS. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 16, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 124. Further, the legislative history indicates that federal involvement in pole attachment regulation was justified only because uniform state
regulation did not exist. /d. at 17, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 125.
96. When a state which has received FCC certification subsequently denies that it has
authority to regulate pole attachments, regulatory responsibility reverts to the FCC.
See Consumers Power Co. v. Telesystems, Inc., 96 Mich. App. 1, 292 N.W.2d 472,
474 (1980).
97. 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54-63.58 (1988); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
98. The tariffs required telephone companies to provide information relating to the type
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ings are leasing arrangements wherein telephone companies provide the
distribution equipment necessary for cable distribution and furnish channels of communication to CATV operators. 99 Although the telephone
carriers responded to the tariffs, they challenged the jurisdictional basis
upon which the FCC required such filings. 100 The FCC, however, affirmed its jurisdictional authority to require the tariffs. It reasoned that
the offering of channels of communication to CATV operators constituted interstate communication and, therefore, came within its jurisdiction as a "common carrier" service. 101
Shortly after finding that it possessed sufficient authority to require
the tariffs, the FCC instituted investigations into the lawfulness of the
tariffs filed by several telephone companies. 102 The scope of inquiry included investigation into whether section 214 of the Communications
Act of 1934, which requires that telephone companies obtain a certificate
of public convenience and necessity from the FCC prior to constructing
or extending any communication lines, applied to telephone companies
that provided channel service offerings. 103 This issue was resolved by the

99.
100.
101.

102.

103.

of service offered and the charges imposed for such service. The service offered was
the non-exclusive transmission of television and FM radio programming from the
CATV's headend equipment to the subscriber's homes. Charges for the service
were based on the length of cable carrying the transmission and on the number of
cable drops to subscriber's homes. In re General Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 448, 450
(1968), aff'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See In re Common Carrier Tariffs for CATV Systems, 4 F.C.C.2d 257 (1966).
/d. at 259-60;seea/so47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (FCC jurisdiction
extends "to all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio.... "); /d.
§ 153(h) ( 1982) ("common carrier" means any person engaged for hire in interstate
or foreign communication by wire or radio); /d. § 202(b) (1982) (FCC has authority
over "services in connection with, the use of common carrier lines of communication, whether derived from wire or radio facilities ... or incidental to radio communication of any kind.").
See In re The General Tel. System, 6 F.C.C.2d 434 (1967); In re The Associated
Bell System Companies, 5 F.C.C.2d 357 (1966); In re California Water & Tel. Co., 5
F.C.C.2d 229 (1966). The investigations were subsequently consolidated for hearing. See In re California Water & Tel. Co., 6 F.C.C.2d 440 (1967); In re California
Water & Tel. Co., 6 F.C.C.2d 441 (1967).
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, title I,§ 214,48 Stat. 1064, 1075-76 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1982)). Section 214 provides:
(a) Exceptions; temporary or emergency service or discontinuance of service; changes in plant, operation or equipment
No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line or of a extension of any line, or shall acquire or operate any line, or extension
thereof, or shall engage in transmission over or by means of such additional or extended line, unless and until there shall first have been obtained
from the Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or construction and operation, of such additional or extended line:
Provided, That no such certificate shall be required under this section for
the construction, acquisition, or operation of (1) a line within a single State
unless such line constitutes part of an interstate line, (2) local, branch, or
terminal lines not exceeding ten miles in length, or (3) any line acquired
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Commission in In re General Telephone Co. 104
In General Telephone, the Commission first addressed the issue of
whether it possessed jurisdiction over channel service offerings when the
reception and transmission facilities utilized in the offerings were located
entirely within one state. 105 Noting that CATV was considered interstate communication because it facilitated the interstate transportation of
television signals, 106 the Commission observed that this was true even
where the broadcast signals " 'emanate from stations located within the
same state in which the CATV system operates.' " 107 Accordingly, the
Commission found that because channel service offerings were links in
the transmission of broadcast signals from the point of origin to the subscriber's home, telephone companies who provide these offerings, irrespective of the location of their facilities, were performing an interstate
communication service. 108
With its jurisdictional authority established, the Commission next
considered whether there were any exceptions that would exempt telephone companies from the requirements of a section 214 certificate of
public convenience and necessity. 109 The telephone companies claimed
that because the lines employed in channel service offerings did not cross

104.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

under section 221 or 222 of this title: Provided further, That the Commission may, upon appropriate request being made, authorize temporary or
emergency service, or the supplementing of existing facilities, without regard to the provisions of this section. No carrier shall discontinue, reduce,
or impair service to a community, or part of a community, unless and until
there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that
neither the present nor future public convenience and necessity will be
adversely affected thereby; except that the Commission may, upon appropriate request being made, authorize temporary or emergency discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of service, or partial discontinuance,
reduction, or impairment of service, without regard to the provisions of
this section. As used in this section the term "line" means any channel of
communication established by the use of appropriate equipment, other
than a channel of communication established by the interconnection of
two or more existing channels: Provided, however, That nothing in this
section shall be construed to require a certificate or other authorization
from the Commission for any installation, replacement, or other changes
in plant, operation, or equipment, other than new construction, which will
not impair the adequacy or quality of service provided.
47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1982).
13 F.C.C.2d 448 (1968), aff'd sub nom., General Tel. Co. v. F.C.C., 413 F.2d 390
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969). Because of administrative procedure,
the section 214 issue was deleted from the consolidated proceeding and a separate
proceeding was initiated to resolve this issue. See In re California Water & Tel. Co.,
7 F.C.C.2d 571 (1967); In re California Water & Tel. Co., 7 F.C.C.2d 575 (1967).
General Tel., 13 F.C.C.2d at 460-61.
Id. at 454-55; see also Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. F.C.C., 387 F.2d 220, 225 (1967)
(CATV systems facilities are a "link in the interstate transportation of television
signals.")
General Tel., 13 F.C.C.2d at 454-55 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1968)).
Id. at 455.
Id. at 456-461.
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state boundaries, section 214(a)(1)'s exclusion of "a line within a single
state unless such line constitutes a part of an interstate line" exempted
them from the requirements of section 214. 110 The Commission rejected
this argument based on section 214's definition of a line as "any channel
of communication established by the use of appropriate equipment." 111
The telephone companies further argued that even if section 214(a)(1)
did not exempt them from section 214, they were exempt under section
214(a)(2). Section 214(a)(2) excludes "local, branch, or terminal lines
not exceeding ten miles in length" from the requirements of section
214. 112 The Commission found that section 214(a)(2) was not applicable
because channel service offerings were a new service rather than a modification of existing services. 113 Consequently, the Commission concluded
that a section 214 certification was necessary before the telephone companies could provide channel service offerings to independent CATV
systems.
Subsequent requests for section 214 certification quickly revealed to
the Commission the extensive affiliation that existed between CATV operators and telephone companies. 114 The Commission expressed concern
over such common ownership in General Telephone, where it stated:
By reason of its control over utility poles, or other local advantages resulting from its status as an existing common carrier in
the community, the telephone company is in a position to preclude or to substantially delay an unaffiliated CATV system
from commencing service and thereby eliminate competition.
Furthermore, construction by a telephone company for an affiliated CATV operator calls for careful scrutiny on the part of
the commission in order to insure against wasteful duplication
or unnecessary construction. 115
As a result, the Commission initiated inquiry and proposed rule-making
into whether telephone companies, either directly or through affiliates,
should be permitted to provide cable television service. 116
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

/d. at 457; see also supra note 103.
General Tel., 13 F.C.C.2d at 457-58.
47 U.S.C. § 214(a)(2) (1982); see also supra note 103.
General Tel., 13 F.C.C. at 459.
Common ownership between telephone companies and CATV systems became apparent from the first petitions that were filed for section 214 certification. In each
petition, some degree of ownership affiliation was found to exist. See Applications
of Telephone Companies for Certain Certificates for Channel Facilities, 34 Fed.
Reg. 6,290, 6,291 (1969).
115. General Tel., 13 F.C.C.2d at 463.
116. See In re Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems and Inquiry Into the
Development of Communications Technology and Services to Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals, 15 F.C.C.2d 417,441-42
(1968); Applications of Telephone Companies for Certain Certificates for Channel
Facilities, 34 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (1969).
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Development of the Cross-Ownership Rules

In In reApplications of Telephone Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna
Television Systems, 117 the FCC considered a variety of issues regarding
the necessity of prohibiting telephone company-CATV cross-ownership.
The CATV companies claimed that a prohibition against cross-ownership was needed because telephone companies were engaged in various
anticompetitive practices which threatened the viability of independent
CATV service. 118 For example, CATV operators asserted that telephone
companies were subsidizing their affiliated CATV operations in an effort
to undercut the prices offered by independent systems. 119 They also alleged that telephone companies were arbitrarily ~efusing to grant pole
space to independent CATV systems in order to eliminate competition
with their own affiliated systems.12o
In response, the telephone companies denied any discriminatory
treatment towards unaffiliated CATV operators and objected to being
singled out from other owners of CATV systems for special conditions
and restrictions. 121 In addition, the telephone companies contended that
their utility poles were private property and, therefore, they were under
no obligation to make pole space available for unaffiliated systems. 122
Upon reviewing the arguments of the parties, the FCC found that
there was an "anomalous competitive situation" between CATV systems
owned by, or affiliated with telephone companies, and independent cable
television systems which relied upon the telephone companies for channel service offerings or access to pole attachments. 123 This anomalous
situation developed from the telephone companies' natural monopoly
over the utility pole lines required for CATV distribution. 124 The Commission reasoned that because of this market power, the potential for
telephone companies to favor affiliated CATV systems over independent
operators necessitated governmental intervention. 125 As a further indication of need for regulation, the Commission noted that telephone company ownership of CATV services "not only tends to exclude others
from entry into that service, but also tends to extend, without need or
justification, the telephone company's monopoly position to broadband
117. 21 F.C.C.2d 307, reconsidered in part, 22 F.C.C.2d 746 (1970), aff'd sub nom. General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
118. /d. at 311-13.
119. /d. at 311.
120. /d. The CATV companies cited other alleged anticompetitive practices, such as
manipulating community leaders to secure CATV franchises, exerting pressure
upon independent CATV operators to force them to accept more expensive distribution systems, and charging rates for pole attachments which were unrelated to the
cost of providing such services. /d. at 311-12.
121. /d. at 310.
122. /d. at 311.
123. /d. at 323.
124. /d. at 324.
125. /d.
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cable facilities and the new and different services such facilities are expected to be providing in the future." 126 Accordingly, the Commission
concluded that the public interest would best be served by prohibiting
telephone companies from engaging in the sale of CATV service within
their telephone service areas. 127
To implement its findings, the Commission amended part 63 of its
rules to include the telephone company-cable television cross-ownership
rules. 128 The rules prevent telephone companies from providing channel
service offerings or pole attachment agreements to controlled or affiliated
CATV systems within their telephone service areas. 129 The cross-ownership rules also require telephone companies to offer CATV systems the
alternative of pole attachment rights before providing a channel distribution service. 130
The FCC's decision to adopt the cross-ownership rules was appealed
to federal court. In General Telephone Co. v. United States, 131 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether the FCC had statutory authority to adopt the cross-ownership rules, and whether the rules
deprived the telephone companies of any rights in violation of the Constitution. Addressing the statutory authority issue, the court noted that the
FCC had a responsibility to " 'make available, so far as possible, to all
the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide and worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges... .' " 132 The court reasoned that development of
CATV service on a national level fell within this responsibility and,
therefore, the FCC had the authority to foster CATV growth by limiting
126. /d. The Commission noted that broadband cable could provide a broader range of
service than could be provided on traditional telephonic service, such as data storage, distribution and retrieval, and facsimile transmissions. /d. at 324-25; see also
General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 851 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971).
127. Applications for Section 241 Certificates, 21 F.C.C.2d at 325-26.
128. 47 C.P.R. § 63.54-63.58 (1988).
129. /d. § 63.54(b). The rules provide that the terms "affiliates" and "control" bar any
financial or business relationship between a telephone company and a CATV system. /d. § 63.54 n.1(a). For example, the following relationships are within the
definitions of control and affiliate: (1) A debtor-creditor relationship except with
respect to communication services; (2) interlocking officers, directors or other employees at the management level; and (3) common ownership by one company in the
other. /d. § 63.54 n.1(b); see also id. § 63.54 n.2 (provisions for determining common ownership in corporations with more than 50 stockholders). Telephone companies must demonstrate the lack of control over, or affiliation with, the CATV
systems as a prerequisite to receiving a section 214 certificate for constructing or
operating a channel distribution service. /d. § 63.55.
130. /d. § 63.57. The offer of a pole attachment right must exist both at the time of
section 214 certification as well as at the time when the CATV operator seeks a local
franchise. /d. The offer must be reasonable with respect to the charges for the pole
attachment and must not unduly restrict the uses that may be made of the channel
by the CATV operator. /d.; see also supra note 23.
131. 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
132. /d. at 854 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
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the involvement of telephone companies in CATV service. 133
With respect to the constitutional issues, the telephone companies
claimed that the CATV service prohibition in the rules was not reasonably related to the goal of ensuring national distribution of cable television.134 The court concluded that the cross-ownership rules were neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable because telephone companies had monopoly
power over CATV distribution systems. 135 Moreover, the court noted
that telephone companies were not completely prevented from entering
the CATV market; rather, they were only prohibited from providing
CATV service within their own telephone service areas. 136
The telephone companies also argued that requiring an offer of pole
space as a prerequisite for receiving permission to construct channel service facilities 137 deprived them of their property without due process of
law. 138 In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that there was no
deprivation of property because telephone companies only were required
to offer pole space when they voluntarily engaged in offering channel service facilities. 139 The requirement of offering pole space was simply a
reasonable condition to entry into the CATV market rather than an unconstitutional taking.t40
C.

Exceptions to the Cross-Ownership Rules

In its effort to ensure that CATV would be available to as wide a
viewing public as possible, the FCC included several exceptions to the
cross-ownership restrictions. Foremost among these exceptions is section 64.56(a). 141 This section provides that where it can be demonstrated
that CATV service could not exist except through common ownership,
or upon a general showing of good cause, the cross-ownership rules will
133. /d. at 854-55. The telephone industry also argued that the FCC's reliance on antitrust principles in formulating the cross-ownership rules was beyond its authority.
The court rejected this argument by finding that the "public convenience and necessity" standard of section 214 was sufficiently broad to permit the Commission to
consider the anticompetitive potential of television company-CATV cross-ownership. /d. at 856-58; see also United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 35152 (1959) (antitrust considerations alone may be sufficient for the FCC to find that
statutory standards could not be met).
134. General Tel., 449 F.2d at 859. The court categorized the issue as "whether the rules
comport with the requirements of substantive due process." /d.
135. /d.
136. /d. at 859-60; see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.54, 64.601 (1988); In re Blanket Section 214
Authorization for Provision by a Telephone Carrier of Lines for its Cable Television
and Other Non-Common Carrier Services Outside its Telephone Service Area, 49
Fed. Reg. 21,333 (1984) (blanket section 214 permission to provide channel service
offerings outside of television service area).
137. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.57 (1988).
138. General Tel., 449 F.2d at 860-61.
139. /d. at 860. A similar analysis was employed by the Supreme Court in F.C.C. v.
Florida Power Co., 480 U.S. 245 (1987), to determine the constitutional validity of
the pole attachment rules. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
140. General Tel., 449 F.2d at 860.
141. 47 C.F.R. § 64.56(a) (1988).
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be waived if such waiver is found by the Commission to be in the public
interest. 142
In 1978, the Commission initiated an investigation to determine if
the procedures for obtaining a cross-ownership waiver could be streamlined.143 As a result of this investigation, the Commission facilitated the
procedure for obtaining waivers by creating a rebuttable presumption
that CATV service could not exist except through common ownership
where it was demonstrated that the waiver was consistent with the public
interest and that the proposed service area contained fewer than thirty
homes per route mile of coaxial cable. 144 In a subsequent proceeding, the
FCC further extended the exceptions to the cross-ownership rules by
adopting an exemption for rural areas. 145 Under this exclusion, telephone companies are exempt from the cross-ownership rules where the
proposed service contains fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. 146

D.

Relaxing the Cross-Ownership Rules

In 1984, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act 147
("Cable Policy Act") to clarify and define the respective responsibilities
of federal and state governments over the regulation of cable television.
Section 533 of the Cable Act, entitled "Ownership Restrictions," effectively incorporated the FCC's cross-ownership rules into the statutory
framework. 148 By enacting this section, Congress implicitly recognized
142. /d.; see also In re Revision of the Processing Policies for Waivers of the Telephone
Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 69 F.C.C.2d 1097, 1110 (1978)
(clarification of what constitutes "good cause" under section 64.56(a)); In re Applications of Telephone Companies For Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities
Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 22 F.C.C.2d 746,
750 (1970).
143. See In re Clarification and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 69 F.C.C.2d 1097
(1978).
144. See 47 C.F.R. § 63.56(b) (1988); In re Revision of the Processing Policies for Waivers of the Telephone Company-Cable Television "Cross Ownership Rules," Sections
63.54 and 64.601 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 82 F.C.C.2d 233,
242-44 (1979). Telephone companies must also submit affidavits verifying the assertions made in the waiver requests. 47 C.F.R. § 63.56(b)(4) (1988). The presumption provided in section 63.56(b) may be rebutted by a showing that more than
thirty homes are contained in the service area or that the opposing party has a
present intention to offer non-affiliated cable service. /d. § 63.56(d)(l),(2).
145. In re Elimination of the Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership
Rules, Sections 63.54-63.56 for Rural Areas, 88 F.C.C.2d 564 (1981); see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Elimination of the Telephone Company-Cable
Television Cross-Ownership Rules for Rural Areas, 84 F.C.C.2d 335 (1981).
146. 47 C.F.R. § 63.58 (1988). When first enacted, the rural exception did not apply
where a competing cable television system was under construction or already in
existence. Elimination of the Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership
Rules, 88 F.C.C.2d at 576. This restriction, however, was eliminated by the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 10, at 56,
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4693-94.
147. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779.
148. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(l)-(2) (Supp. IV 1986) with 47 C.F.R. § 63.54(a)-(b)
(1988). The Cable Policy Act also directed the FCC to adopt implementing regula-
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the continued need for prohibiting affiliation between telephone companies and CATV systems. 149 Less than five years later, however, the FCC
found it necessary to re-examine the cross-ownership rules to determine
whether the original justifications for these rules were still valid. 150
The Commission addressed the continued viability of the cross-ownership rules by examining the rules in light of the current market place
conditions confronting the CATV industry. 151 From its investigation,
the Commission found that because approximately eighty percent of the
nation was CATV ready, much of the anticompetitive potential which
originally prompted the need for the cross-ownership rules was no longer
present. 152 For example, telephone companies could no longer obtain the
economic and competitive advantage of being the first CATV provider in
the area. 153 Similarly, the emergence of several large CATV networks
lessened the need to protect the CATV industry from potential competitors.154 Accordingly, the Commission tentatively concluded that a flat
ban on television-cable affiliation was no longer necessary to protect the
mature CATV industry.Iss
IV.

A.

MANDATORY ACCESS TO POLE ATTACHMENTS

The Need for Pole Access Regulation

In the same breath in which it tentatively concluded to relax the
cross-ownership rules, the Commission acknowledged that the CATV in-

149.

150.
151.
152.
153.

154.

155.

tions for section 533. The FCC responded by adopting regulations which were essentially the same as the cross-ownership rules. See Amendments of Parts 1, 63 and
76 of the Commission's Rules to Implement the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637 (1985). But see supra note 146.
See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 10, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 4693 ("[T]he intent of section [533(b) was] to codify current FCC rules concerning the provision of video programming over cable systems by common
carriers. . . .").
See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections
63.54-63.58, 2 F.C.C.Rcd. 5092 (1987) (notice of inquiry).
See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections
63.54-63.58, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 5849, 5881-54 (1988).
Id. at 5853; see also supra note 10.
Cross-Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. at 5853. This reasoning, however, may not be
true with respect to new broadband services (i.e., data distribution, facsimile transmission) which is just developing. Because telephone companies have existing plant
and facilities which could be adapted in a relatively short time to provide these
services, they have the ability to enter the broadband services market very rapidly.
Consequently, they would secure the market efficiencies that come with being the
first provider in an area.
I d. The Commission found that the lack of competition in the CATV industry had
stifled the development of additional broadband services. By permitting telephone
companies to compete in the CATV business, a greater variety of choices for consumers would result. Id. at 5857-58.
Id. at 5853. Significantly, the Commission did not contemplate disposing of the
cross-ownership rules altogether. Rather, it simply proposed to relax the standards
with respect to what constituted "ownership" or "control" for purposes of the rules.
See id. at 5868-69 (Appendix II).
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dustry's growth had not completely eliminated the potential for predatory practices by telephone companies. Consequently, the Commission
indicated that it might implement rules which would require telephone
companies to provide equal access to pole space as a prerequisite for entering the CATV business. 156 Indeed, new regulations which mandate
access to pole attachments may very well be necessary. 157 Before adopting such rules, however, the present regulatory framework that governs
cable television should be examined to determine if existing rules could
provide the needed protection.
Under the current regulatory scheme that governs cable television,
two distinct regulations may ensure that CATV operators will have access to pole attachments. The first regulation is section 224(b) of the
Pole Attachment Act which gives the Commission the authority to ensure that the rates charged for pole attachments are just and reasonable.158 Section 224(b)(l) can be utilized to compel access in a limited
number of situations. For example, if a utility pole owner discontinues
providing communication space solely to avoid FCC jurisdiction, the
FCC could claim jurisdiction based on an unreasonable practice. 159 Similarly, termination of a pole attachment agreement in retaliation for a
CATV operator's complaint to the Commission can be set aside as an
unreasonable practice. 160
Section 224(b)(l), however, does not directly require utilities Y> provide space for pole attachments. 161 This section also does not prohibit a
telephone company from terminating a pole attachment agreement, or
allowing an agreement to expire, where the telephone company can
demonstrate a reasonable explanation for the action. 162 If telephone
companies are permitted to compete in the CATV business, a higher
rental offer for pole space by an affiliated CATV system may constitute a
reason for refusing to renew an independent CATV operator's pole attachment agreement. Consequently, section 224(b) of the Pole Attachment Act does not satisfactorily ensure access to pole attachments for
independent CATV operators.
The second regulation which may guarantee access to pole space is
section 541(a)(2) of the Cable Policy Act. 163 This section provides:
156.
157.
158.
159.

160.
161.
162.
163.

/d. at 5859-60.
See infra notes 184-193 and accompanying text.
47 u.s.c. § 224(b)(1) (1982).
See Cable Information Serv., Inc. v. Appalachian Power Co., 81 F.C.C.2d 383, 391
n.8 (1980); S. REP. No. 580, supra note 4, at 16, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 124. The FCC, however, will not grant relief upon an alleged unreasonable denial of pole attachment access where a CATV operator does not hold a valid
cable television franchise. Paragon Cable Tel., Inc. v. F.C.C., 822 F.2d 152, 153-54
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
See Cross-Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. at 5871 n.16.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779, 2786 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2)
(Supp. IV 1986)).
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Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the construction
of a cable system over public rights-of-way, and through easements, which is within the area to be served by the cable system
and which have been dedicated for compatible uses.... 164
Section 541(a)(2) appears to grant a franchised CATV operator a right of
access to utility poles that occupy a public right-of-way. 165 Similarly, the
section arguably grants a right of access to any pole that occupies an
easement, whether public or private, as long as the easement is dedicated
for compatible use. This latter conclusion is supported by statutory provisions following section 541(a)(2) that require the CATV operator to
compensate the owner of the property for use of the easement. 166 The
legislative history of the Cable Policy Act indicates that these provisions
may have been included to avoid the taking proscriptions of the Fifth
Amendment. 167 Section 633 of the House version of the Cable Policy
Act, which required landlords to provide access to their property for
CATV attachment, contained language substantially similar to the language used in section 541(a)(2)(A)-(C). 168 In analyzing this section, the
drafters of the Cable Policy Act acknowledged that the section was
designed to avoid the unconstitutional taking problem in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 169 Loretto involved a statute which
required New York landlords to permit CATV hookups to their property.170 The Supreme Court found that this statute authorized a taking
of property for which just compensation was due. 171
164. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
165. See H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 10, at 59, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 4969; see also Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund
VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (Congress intended section 541(a)(2) to
create a right of access).
166. These provisions provide that in using the easements, the CATV operator shall
ensure:
(A) that the safety, functioning, and appearance of the property and the
convenience and safety of other persons not be adversely affected by the
installation or construction of facilities necessary for a cable system;
(B) that the cost of the installation, construction, operation, or removal of
such facilities be borne by the cable operator or subscriber, or a combination of both; and
(C) that the owner of the property be justly compensated by the cable
operator for any damages caused by the installation, construction, operation, or removal of such facilities by the cable operator.
47 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(2)(A)-(C) (Supp. IV 1986).
167. The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment provides:
Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
168. See H.R. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984).
169. 458 U.S. 419 (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 10, at 79-81, 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4716-18.
170. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421-25; see also supra text accompanying note 64.
171. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 425-41; see also supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
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Section 633, however, was deleted from the enacted version of the
Cable Act. 172 Although the significance of the deletion of section 633 is
debatable, it can be argued that the provisions of section 633 were transferred and preserved in section 541(a)(2). Thus, by requiring compensation to be paid to the owners of the easements, it can be inferred that the
drafters of section 541(a)(2) contemplated that this section would mandate access and, therefore, would authorize a taking. Under such a view,
"easement" as used in section 541(a)(2) includes both public and private
easements. 173 Furthermore, in light of the Cable Policy Act's express
purpose of encouraging the growth and development of CATV systems, 174 it is reasonable to conclude that section 541 (a)(2) is intended to
grant a right of access to pole space on poles that occupy public rights-ofway as well as private easements that are dedicated to compatible uses.
The FCC, however, maintains that section 541(a)(2) does not guarantee access to pole space in all cases; rather, this section simply permits
CATV operators to use the same rights-of-way and easements that telephone companies utilize. 175 Indeed, nowhere in section 54l(a)(2) is there
explicit language which requires telephone companies to give over a portion of their pole or conduit space to CATV systems. 176 Moreover, the
subsections that require just compensation can be narrowly construed as
requiring compensation only in the event that a CATV operator damages
the telephone companies' property when installing its own poles or conduits, rather than as requiring compensation for a taking. 177 The deletion of section 633 from the enacted version of the Cable Policy Act
arguably supports a narrow construction of the compensation provisions
of section 541(a)(2). Although section 633 contained compensation Ian172. Cf 47 U.S.C. § 541(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
173. See Centel Cable TV v. Admiral's Cove ~soc., 835 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1988)
(CATV system had implied right of action under section 54l(a)(2) to enforce a
claimed right to provide CATV service to residential community); Cable TV Fund
14-A, Ltd. v. Property Owners Ass'n Chesapeake Ranch Estates, Inc., 706 F. Supp.
422 (D. Md. 1989). See generally Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enterprises, 633
F. Supp. 1315 (D. Del. 1986); Meyerson, The Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REv. 543, 610-12 (1985).
174. See 47 U.S.C. § 521(2) (Supp. IV 1986); see also H.R. REP. No. 934, supra note 10,
at 59, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4969 ("[A)ny private arrangement which seeks to restrict a cable system's use of such easements or rights of way
which have been granted to other utilities are in violation of [section 54l(a)(2)] and
not enforceable.").
175. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections
63.54-63.58, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 5849, 5854, 5871 n.17 (1988).
176. See supra text accompanying note 164.
177. See supra note 166. A narrow construction of the compensation requirements in
section 541(a)(2) is logical in light of the applicability of the Pole Attachment Act.
Once the CATV operators receive pole space, the compensation for access is governed by the rate formula provisions of the Pole Attachment Act. See supra notes
47-57 and accompanying text. Thus, if the compensation requirements of section
54l(a)(2) are construed as requiring compensation for access to telephone company
poles rather than damages incurred by CATV operators utilizing the public easements, the rate provisions of the Pole Attachment Act would be superfluous.
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guage similar to that contained in section 541(a)(2)(A)-(C), its language
was much broader. 178 Section 633 included a provision which would
have required the FCC or a state agency to create regulations for ensuring that just compensation was provided for use of the landlord's property. In contrast, section 541(a)(2) provides that just compensation is to
be ensured by the cable operator and is required only in the event of
damages. 179 Because it is questionable whether section 541(a)(2) satisfies
the just compensation requirements of the Constitution, it can be argued
that had Congress intended for section 541(a)(2) to authorize a taking it
would have included the broader compensation language of section
633.180
Section 541(a)(2) can also be construed as compelling access only
where the utility poles are occupying public rights-of-way or public easements.181 It can be inferred that by deleting section 633 from the Cable
Policy Act, Congress implicitly rejected the creation of a right of access
to private property. Therefore, section 541(a)(2)'s use of the word easement means a public, rather than a private, easement. 182 Under such an
interpretation, telephone companies could not be required to provide
pole access to a competing CATV operator unless every pole in a particular service area occupied a public right-of-way or a public easement. Accordingly, telephone companies would be able to deny access where their
poles were located on private property, regardless of whether the easement was dedicated to a compatible use.
Ifthe FCC is correct in construing section 541 so as to deny a general right of access to pole space, the present regulatory framework
which governs CATV is clearly insufficient to prevent telephone companies from manipulating their control over access to utility poles. But
even if the FCC is incorrect and section 541 does guarantee a right of
access to pole space, the potential for predatory pole access practices will
still exist. Because section 541 cfoes not guarantee that telephone companies will provide equal access to pole space, these companies would be
able to manipulate pole access to their affiliates' advantage. For example,
if a telephone company gives the last remaining space on its poles to an
affiliated CATV system, their easement would no longer be dedicated for
compatible use and section 541 would not be applicable. 183 Thus, irre178. See H.R. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984).
179. See supra note 166.
180. See Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 157-58 (3rd Cir. 1989). But
see Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F.
Supp. 871, 874 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
181. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sections
63.54-63.58, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. 5849, 5871 n.17 (1988).
182. See Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151 (3rd Cir. 1989) (Cable Policy
Act does not give CATV systems a right of access to multi-unit dwellings for purpose of providing cable service to tenants). But see supra notes 166-174 and accompanying text. See generally Meyerson, supra note 173, at 610-12.
183. Accord Meyerson, supra note 173, at 611-12.
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spective of whether section 541 guarantees pole access over public or private easements, new equal access regulations should be implemented to
ensure a competitive environment if telephone companies are permitted
to enter the CATV business.

Implementing the Mandatory Pole Access Rules
To ensure that the new pole access rules will be effective in eliminating pole access discrimination, several factors should be considered in
defining the scope of these rules. First, the rules should be designed to
prevent favoritism to affiliated CATV systems and inhibit monopolization of new broadband services. 184 A rule which requires telephone companies to certify that they presently offer equal pole access for cable
related hook-ups to both independent and affiliated CATV systems
would accomplish these designs. This certification procedure should be a
prerequisite for receiving permission to participate in the CATV
business.
Second, the rules should eliminate any potential for the telephone
companies to terminate existing pole attachments on the basis of a higher
rate offer by an affiliated CATV system. 185 Such a goal could be
achieved by obligating telephone companies to offer pole access at identical rates and terms to both affiliated and independent CATV systems. 186
The rules should also discourage any pole access advantages that
telephone companies possess over poles which are owned by other utilities. Telephone companies may possess such advantages because they
have pre-existing lease arrangements with power companies for use of the
power companies' poles. If the telephone companies were to use the
leases to secure access on the power companies' poles, independent
CATV operators would be at a distinct competitive disadvantage. By
prohibiting affiliated CATV systems from utilizing telephone company
access rights to poles owned by other utilities, such advantages would
effectively be discouraged.1s1

B.

184. Because of the relative infancy of the market for broadband services, a rule requiring equal access to pole space for independent CATV operators would prevent telephone companies from rapidly entering and monopolizing this market. See supra
note 153.
185. Because the Pole Attachment Act does not mandate access, the FCC arguably will
possess jurisdiction over a termination of pole access only when the termination
constituted an unreasonable practice. See supra text accompanying notes 158-60. If
the termination is based on higher rate offer by another CATV system, however, the
termination may be viewed as a reasonable practice. See supra text accompanying
notes 161-162.
186. This rule would also minimize the ability of the telephone companies to employ
such alleged anticompetitive practices as overcharging for make ready work, requiring large prepayments, and delaying work completion. See Cross-Ownership Rules,
3 F.C.C.Rcd. at 5852-53.
187. The FCC has indicated that it may prohibit telephone companies from providing
CATV service when equal access to power utility poles is not available. See CrossOwnership Rules, 3 F.C.C.Rcd. at 5860. This solution, however, is unnecessarily
restrictive. Although the rule would effectively curb the telephone companies' abil-
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Finally, from the Supreme Court's holdings in Loretto v. Teleprompter188 and Florida Power Co. v. F.C.C., 189 it is·apparent that rules
which require a property owner to dedicate a portion of their property
for CATV attachments constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment
for which just compensation is required. 190 Because the new access rules
would require telephone companies to provide pole space for independent CATV hook-ups, they could arguably run afoul of the takings proscriptions.191 Consequently, the equal access rules should include
provisions which require that just compensation be paid for any access
that telephone companies are required to provide. The just compensation provisions could be developed from the rate determination formula
of the Pole Attachment Act 192 as well as the compensation considerations contained in section 633 of the House version of the Cable Policy
Act.I93
V.

CONCLUSION

For the past two decades, effective regulation of cable television has
produced an environment in which this new communications medium
has flourished. But with the goal of nation-wide dissemination of cable
television rapidly reaching fruition, much of the anticompetitive behavior
which once threatened the viability of an infant CATV industry is no
longer present. Accordingly, the FCC has tentatively concluded to relax

188.
189.
190.
191.

192.
193.

ity to utilize their relationships with power companies for the benefit of their affili·
ates, it would discourage the very same competition that the FCC seeks to
encourage by relaxing the cross-ownership rules. See supra notes 151-155 and accompanying text. Conversely, a rule which prohibits an affiliated CATV system
from utilizing a telephone company's access rights to poles owned by a power company would eliminate the potential for anticompetitive behavior while preserving
competition in the CATV market. Both affiliated and independent CATV systems
should compete on an equal basis for power company pole space.
458 U.S. 419 (1982); see also supra notes 63-64, 169-171 and accompanying text.
480 U.S. 245 (1987); see also supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
See supra note 167.
Several theories can be advanced for finding that the equal access rules do not con·
stitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. It can be argued that because telephone companies have monopolistic control over access to essential resources,
antitrust principles require the telephone companies to make the resources available
to others on equal terms. See General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 86061 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341
(1963); United States v. Terminal Ry. Assoc., 224 U.S. 383 (1912). Similarly, it can
be argued that the equal access rules do not amount to a taking because they are
simply a reasonable precondition to entry into the CATV business. Cf General Tel.
Co., 449 F.2d at 860. Because it is uncertain whether either of these theories would
be adopted by a court, just compensation provisions should be included to ensure
the constitutional validity of the equal access rules.
See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
See H.R. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 633 (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984); see also supra notes 167-173, 178-180 and accompanying text.
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the telephone company-cable television cross-ownership rules-rules
which once partially sheltered the CATV industry from competition.
Indeed, increased competition in the CATV market is likely to encourage the exploration of new communication services as well as increase the responsiveness of CATV providers to the needs of the
marketplace. Increased competition from telephone companies, however, raises anew the fear that these companies will utilize their monopolistic control over the means of access for cable distribution to favor an
affiliated CATV system. The regulatory framework which presently governs cable television access to pole space is not sufficient to protect independent CATV systems from predatory pole access practices.
Therefore, to balance the benefits of injecting competitive efficiencies into
the CATV market against the increased potential for anticoi:npetitive
pole access behavior, rules should be implemented that require telephone
companies to provide equal access to pole space to independent CATV
systems as a precondition for entry into the CATV market.
John P. Morrissey

